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Deserialization of untrusted data

ID: cs/unsafe-deserialization-untrusted-input
Kind: path-problem
Severity: error
Precision: high
Tags:
   - security
   - external/cwe/cwe-502
Query suites:
   - csharp-code-scanning.qls
   - csharp-security-extended.qls
   - csharp-security-and-quality.qls

Click to see the query in the CodeQL repository

Deserializing an object from untrusted input may result in security problems, such as denial of service or remote code execution.

Recommendation

Avoid deserializing objects from an untrusted source, and if not possible, make sure to use a safe deserialization framework.

Example

In this example, text from an HTML text box is deserialized using a JavaScriptSerializer with a simple type resolver. Using a type resolver means that arbitrary code may be executed.

using System.Web.UI.WebControls;
using System.Web.Script.Serialization;

class Bad
{
    public static object Deserialize(TextBox textBox)
    {
        JavaScriptSerializer sr = new JavaScriptSerializer(new SimpleTypeResolver());
        // BAD
        return sr.DeserializeObject(textBox.Text);
    }
}

To fix this specific vulnerability, we avoid using a type resolver. In other cases, it may be necessary to use a different deserialization framework.

using System.Web.UI.WebControls;
using System.Web.Script.Serialization;

class Good
{
    public static object Deserialize(TextBox textBox)
    {
        JavaScriptSerializer sr = new JavaScriptSerializer();
        // GOOD: no unsafe type resolver
        return sr.DeserializeObject(textBox.Text);
    }
}

In the following example potentially untrusted stream and type is deserialized using a DataContractJsonSerializer which is known to be vulnerable with user supplied types.

using System.Runtime.Serialization.Json;
using System.IO;
using System;

class BadDataContractJsonSerializer
{
    public static object Deserialize(string type, Stream s)
    {
        // BAD: stream and type are potentially untrusted
        var ds = new DataContractJsonSerializer(Type.GetType(type));
        return ds.ReadObject(s);
    }
}

To fix this specific vulnerability, we are using hardcoded Plain Old CLR Object (POCO) type. In other cases, it may be necessary to use a different deserialization framework.

using System.Runtime.Serialization.Json;
using System.IO;
using System;

class Poco
{
    public int Count;

    public string Comment;
}

class GoodDataContractJsonSerializer
{
    public static Poco Deserialize(Stream s)
    {
        // GOOD: while stream is potentially untrusted, the instantiated type is hardcoded
        var ds = new DataContractJsonSerializer(typeof(Poco));
        return (Poco)ds.ReadObject(s);
    }
}

References

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