Server-side request forgery¶
ID: rb/request-forgery
Kind: path-problem
Security severity: 9.1
Severity: error
Precision: high
Tags:
- security
- external/cwe/cwe-918
Query suites:
- ruby-code-scanning.qls
- ruby-security-extended.qls
- ruby-security-and-quality.qls
Click to see the query in the CodeQL repository
Directly incorporating user input into an HTTP request without validating the input can facilitate server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks. In these attacks, the request may be changed, directed at a different server, or via a different protocol. This can allow the attacker to obtain sensitive information or perform actions with escalated privilege.
Recommendation¶
To guard against SSRF attacks you should avoid putting user-provided input directly into a request URL. Instead, maintain a list of authorized URLs on the server; then choose from that list based on the input provided. Alternatively, ensure requests constructed from user input are limited to a particular host or more restrictive URL prefix.
Example¶
The following example shows an HTTP request parameter being used directly to form a new request without validating the input, which facilitates SSRF attacks. It also shows how to remedy the problem by validating the user input against a known fixed string.
require "excon"
require "json"
class PostsController < ActionController::Base
def create
user = params[:user_id]
# BAD - user can control the entire URL of the request
users_service_domain = params[:users_service_domain]
response = Excon.post("#{users_service_domain}/logins", body: {user_id: user}).body
token = JSON.parse(response)["token"]
# GOOD - path is validated against a known fixed string
path = if params[:users_service_path] == "v1/users"
"v1/users"
else
"v2/users"
end
response = Excon.post("users-service/#{path}", body: {user_id: user}).body
token = JSON.parse(response)["token"]
@post = Post.create(params[:post].merge(user_token: token))
render @post
end
end
References¶
Common Weakness Enumeration: CWE-918.