Call to memset
may be deleted¶
ID: cpp/memset-may-be-deleted
Kind: problem
Security severity: 7.8
Severity: warning
Precision: high
Tags:
- security
- external/cwe/cwe-14
Query suites:
- cpp-code-scanning.qls
- cpp-security-extended.qls
- cpp-security-and-quality.qls
Click to see the query in the CodeQL repository
Calling memset
or bzero
on a buffer to clear its contents may get optimized away by the compiler if the buffer is not subsequently used. This is not desirable behavior if the buffer contains sensitive data that could somehow be retrieved by an attacker.
Recommendation¶
Use memset_s
(from C11) instead of memset
, as memset_s
will not get optimized away. Alternatively use platform-supplied functions such as SecureZeroMemory
or bzero_explicit
that make the same guarantee. Passing the -fno-builtin-memset
option to the GCC/Clang compiler usually also prevents the optimization. Finally, you can use the public-domain secure_memzero
function (see references below). This function, however, is not guaranteed to work on all platforms and compilers.
Example¶
The following program fragment uses memset
to erase sensitive information after it is no longer needed:
char password[MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH];
// read and verify password
memset(password, 0, MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
Because of dead store elimination, the call to memset
may be removed by the compiler (since the buffer is not subsequently used), resulting in potentially sensitive data remaining in memory.
The best solution to this problem is to use the memset_s
function instead of memset
:
char password[MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH];
// read and verify password
memset_s(password, MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH, 0, MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
References¶
CERT C Coding Standard: MSC06-C. Beware of compiler optimizations.
USENIX: The Advanced Computing Systems Association: Dead Store Elimination (Still) Considered Harmfuls
Common Weakness Enumeration: CWE-14.